Editorial Comment: by Kampmeier, A.
CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS. I 3 I 
us than as they are developed in our subjectivity. The idea is as 
absurd as if we should say that the number three is a part of a 
group of three persons. Three is not in any way comparable with 
three persons. 
Dr. Carus is very right when he says (p. 63 ) : 
"The problems concerning the foundations of geometry and of 
mathematics in general are by no means so definitely settled that 
one solution may be said to have acquired the concensus of the 
competent, and for this reason I feel that a little mutual charity is 
quite commendable." 
Thus, if I may differ somewhat in opinion from Dr. Carus, I 
must openly beg his charity for advocating my own views against 
him. I may have been led to these discussions "by an enthusiasm 
as strong as the zeal of religious devotees which . . . . has a humorous 
aspect," but I am of the firm belief that they will perchance "serve 
to widen the horizon of his views," although not endowed with the 
positive power of "reversing, antiquating or abolishing the assured 
accomplishment" of Dr. Carus. 
With us it is never "strange that the nature of man's rationality 
is by no means universally recognized." It seems very natural that 
"opinions vary greatly concerning its foundation and its origin." 
We are quite satisfied with the coexistence of various different sys-
tems, and so we shall be always happy to receive varying criticisms. 
YOSHIO MIKAMI. 
OHARA IN KAZUSA, JAPAN, March, 2, 1910. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT. 
On a first perusal of Mr. Yoshio Mikami's criticism of my views 
concerning the foundations of geometry, I thought that no reply 
would be needed for any one who has read my main expositions of 
the problem, the article in question as well as my books Kant's Pro-
legomena and The Foundations of Mathematics. But I am anxious 
to let every criticism receive consideration, and so I take pleasure 
in publishing Mr. Mikami's remarks. Since, however, many of our 
readers have not read the writings under discussion, I will briefly 
point out why Mr. Mikami's arguments fail to apply to my position. 
It is true enough that I propose to lay the foundation of geom-
etry without having recourse to axioms. However I have not for 
that reason, as Mr. Mikami says, "unconsciously introduced an as-
sumption or assumptions," but I build all the formal sciences upon 
the facts of our own existence. In doing so I simply follow the 
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132 THE MONIST. 
genetic process of mathematical conceptions. Mathematical concep-
tions did not originate through assumptions or arbitrarily invented 
axioms but like the idea of numbers they are due to abstraction, and 
they originated naturally in the course of the evolution of the human 
mind at a certain period when man was ready for them. 
We cannot construct anything from nothing. The idea of build-
ing mathematics on emptiness is unjustified, but I claim that the 
method as well as a field of action were procured together with its 
definite purpose at the time of its origin by the needs of the situa-
tion. And it is rather strange that this simplest method of investi-
gating the genesis of mathematics has not yet been attempted for 
laying its philosophical foundation. Here Mr. Mikami has utterly 
failed to understand my position, and I wonder that he criticised 
me so boldly while he is unfamiliar with the most important argu-
ments which I have tried to impress upon my readers. 
The domain of mathematics is a field of anyness, and so long 
as Mr. Mikami omits the very mention of this conception, he will. 
be incapable of understanding, let alone criticizing, my position. 
The very word "anyness" throws a flood of light upon the problem 
and helps us to solve it. As soon as man learns to speak, he can 
discriminate between concrete and abstract things. He generalizes 
and speaks of qualities which do not exist by themselves, and when 
he comes to generalize the purely formal aspects of experience he 
creates notions which do not apply to one concrete object alone but 
to any object, and thus acquire a universal significance. This pos-
sibility of thinking in terms of anyness is the foundation of all 
science and especially of the formal sciences. 
Bodily forms are concrete, but pure forms are of an abstract 
nature; they are mental constructions. Pure form is purely rela-
tional; it is a matter of arrangement, either succession or juxta-
position, and contains nothing which can be expressed in terms either 
of matter or energy. 
The idea of form has been ultimately derived from experience, 
for there is nothing in the world of our senses which is not some-
how endowed with form, and he who speaks of objects as being 
devoid of form denies the most obvious facts of our experience. 
Experience furnishes the data of all our knowledge, and these 
data can be analyzed into the sense elements of feelings and their 
forms. The generalization of the idea of form leads to one very 
peculiar result, which is, that the constructions we make apply gen-
erally for any case of the same kind. The reason is simple enough. 
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Form is the most abstract quality which is common to all things, 
and so we characterize the purely formal as anyness. But there 
is another point to be noted. When dealing with sense experience 
we have always before us concrete and isolated cases, but in making 
constructions of pure form we can exhaust all possibilities and so 
we can be systematic. Instead of observing isolated cases we can 
formulate a general law, which means a description of the essential 
features of all possible cases. Here lies the significance of the 
purely formal sciences, and this is the reason why the nature of 
form is the fundamental problem of science and philosophy. The 
purely formal sciences furnish us with a general scheme excluding 
impossibilities, and are of such a nature as to permit us to arrange 
all possible cases systematically. If formal thought were not capable 
of furnishing such a priori systems, science would be impossible. 
We have seen that the idea of anyness originated by abstrac-
tion, by dropping all features of concreteness, and we know that 
primitive man began purely formal operations, such as counting, by 
creating a system of reference in units. He counted heads of cattle 
on his fingers and he interrelated the objects to be counted with his 
names of units or with some mnemotechnic help which served him 
as an abacus. We cannot doubt that man originally used his fingers 
as a system of reference, though the essential things were not his con-
crete fingers but the idea of units which the fingers represented. 
Accordingly arithmetic and in the same way geometry did not 
originate from nothing, but through abstraction by omitting those 
features of experience which at the moment were not wanted for 
the purpose of understanding a certain situation. 
The mode of creating such systems of anyness is due to man's 
mental activity from which, however, anything concrete, be it matter 
or energy, has been excluded. In arithmetic this pure activity is 
a progress from point to point, thereby creating discrete units; in 
geometry, however, we trace continuous paths of our motion called 
lines. We start with our ability to do certain things; we limit our 
activity to the abstract field of anyness and then we proceed to make 
constructions of pure form. No assumptions nor axioms are needed, 
except the principle of consistency. And we may create the condi-
tions as we please. We may build up a system of numerals or the 
plane of Euclidean geometry. We may think of any lines of the 
same size as equal, or we may also consider direction and treat lines 
as vectors. 
In one sense anyness is nothing. It is a state of being devoid 
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of anything definite and concrete, but it is not, for that reason, ab-
solutely nothing. The field of anyness possesses definite positive 
qualities, among which most significant is the quality of the absence 
of all peculiarity, which means that the same action taken now and 
here is the same as if taken at any other time or in any other place. 
The field of operation is throughout the same, and so constructions 
are different only if they have been made different. In arithmetic 
a unit is a unit whenever or wherever it is posited, and in geometry 
progress can be made in any direction and without any limitation, 
but the same figure will always be the same. 
Note that the principle of action without further limitation in-
volves the highly important concept of infinitude. The idea of a 
progress from unit to unit implies that wherever I stop I might con-
tinue, and there is a possibility of progressing to further units be-
yond any stopping place. It is strange that the idea of infinitude 
has been a stumbling block to the minds of many thinkers, profound 
as well as shallow, mystics as well as scientists, but I wish to say 
here that from my standpoint infinitude is the simpler concept, and 
finiteness a more complicated idea. The field of action without fur-
ther limitation is a primitive idea in the fundamentals of mathe-
matics, and so any kind of field of a priori activity will be infinite 
unless by a special assumption a limit is imposed upon the activity 
with which we start. However, we do not get rid of infinitude, 
even if we limit our field of operation and make it finite in one way 
or another, because the very idea of a limit is a boundary which 
implies a cis and a trans. If there is a boundary we postulate a 
beyond. Mr. Mikami does not recognize the logical necessity of 
this statement, for he speaks of spherical space, and complains that 
I introduce into my notion of spherical space the idea of Euclidean 
space with its infinitely straight line. But such is not the case. I 
only introduce a logical principle, for even if we have a spherical 
space we would have to determine the radius of the sphere, and here 
again we would have the choice of a radius from the infinitely small 
to the infinitely great, and a sphere of the radius of the infinitely 
great would again restore infinitude to its proper birthplace. If, 
however, we assume a spherical space of a definite radius, we have 
a very concrete case, and have left the field of anyness, which ac-
cording to my conception of the foundations of mathematics is the 
fundamental idea without which we will be bewildered by a tangle. 
Not having familiarized himself with my views of anyness, 
Mr. Mikami does not understand that our space-conception may 
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be ultimately based on experience, while in spite of it the construc-
tion of mathematical space is a priori and purely formal. He sees 
a contradiction in the two statements, "without motion no space-
conception" and "pure mathematics does not depend upon the 
senses." Mr. Mikami declares that the former statement is tanta-
mount to saying that "our notion of space is ultimately based upon 
our senses." Does he deny that we can make abstractions? I grant 
that in reality we can not produce "whiteness" as a thing by itself, 
or "motion-in-itself," a change of place without moving objects 
and devoid of energy. But in thought we can create such abstract 
ideas, and I claim that the whole field of mathematics is such an 
abstract conception which does not exist in objective reality; it 
is purely mental. Being a construction which purposely omits every-
thing concrete, mathematics is devoid of sense elements. Expe-
rience, as I understand the word, consists of sense perceptions, and 
sense perceptions contain both elements, the sensual and the formal. 
By omitting the sensual we retain the idea of pure form, and so all 
systems of pure form are products of the mind, and are constructed 
by means of abstractions ultimately derived from experience. 
Kant's transcendentalism is based on the argument that mathe-
matical constructions are a priori, and so, Kant claims, they can not 
have been deduced from experience. He insists that they are the 
condition of all experiences, for experience becomes only possible by 
relying upon the purely formal sciences, including pure natural 
science which is based on the conception of causality. I can not 
look for causes or the effects of causes, unless I have in my mind 
the idea of the law of causation. These conditions of all experience 
Kant calls transcendental, and transcendental ideas, such as logic, 
arithmetic, geometry, or in a word reason, as well as the conceptions 
of time and space form the constitution of the human mind; but how 
mind originates Kant has never investigated. 
I find fault with Kant's use of the term "experience" which 
he mostly restricts to the idea of sense -experience but sometimes 
employs in the broader meaning of sense experience as guided by 
logic and other principles of formal thought. Mathematics has 
nothing to do with experience in the narrower sense, but the means 
of its construction have been derived by abstraction from experience 
in the broader sense. Accordingly my propositions do not involve 
a contradiction as Kantians would be inclined to think and as Mr. 
Mikami actually declares. 
There is another point on which my view differs from that of 
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Kant. It is what he calls idealism, but which is truly subjectivism. 
The domain of the mind is the realm of ideas, and so Kant con-
cludes that time and space and reason (or in a word all branches 
of formal thought) are ideal, and he uses the term in contrast to 
real or objective. In truth he identifies the term "ideal" with "sub-
jective," and thus he claims that forms appertain to the mind and not 
to the objective world. Here lies the fallacy of Kant. We must 
consider that there is no subject in itself. Every thinking subject 
is a concrete and real body moving about as an object in the ob-
jective world. A thinker considered as a subject is only the inner 
aspect of an objective personality, and this objective personality is 
as much a part and parcel of the objective world as any other object. 
The experience of a subject is due to the objective contact of a 
thinking being, and this contact is experienced, not in pure sub-
jectivity but by its bodily and objective sense organs. 
The experiences of a thinker are first of all part and parcel of 
his objective body as it moves and is moved about, as it pushes and 
is pushed, as it is exposed to objective contact, mechanical as well 
as chemical or electric, and otherwise in its relation in the objective 
world. Form accordingly, with its quality of relationship, of juxta-
position, of difference of structure, etc., is a feature of the objective 
world and the idea of form is its representation in the domain of 
subjectivity. Accordingly the evidence that form is purely subjec-
tive is not forthcoming and stands in contradiction to what we 
know about the nature of form. If form were purely subjective, 
we would be compelled to deny objectivity altogether. 
The abstractions from which the purely formal sciences have 
been created have been derived from experience, and since at the 
same time the formal sciences serve a practical purpose, we must 
assume that the objective world contains features which somehow 
correspond to its fundamental conceptions. This is certainly borne 
out by experience, for the formal sciences are the most indispensable 
part of our cognition. Without them man would not be a rational 
being. 
We have repeatedly insisted upon the truth that all mathematical 
sciences, logic as well as arithmetic, are ideal in the sense that they 
are mental constructions. There are no logarithms in the objective 
world, but only in our mind, and the same is true of our idea of 
purely formal motion. There are no numbers running about in the 
starry heavens nor in the world of chemical atoms. Nevertheless the 
objective world is so constructed that by counting and measuring 
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CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS. I 3 7 
we can acquire an insight into its constitution. We can determine 
magnitudes, distances and other properties of objects, and that is 
all that is needed. 
Human reason exists as reason only in the human brain, but 
there are features in the objective world which make it possible 
that the theorems of reason assist us in comprehending the con-
ditions of things. This objective counterpart of human reason has 
been characterized as the cosmic world order. The Germans call 
it Gesetzm'dssigkeit, a word which we have translated by "lawdom," 
meaning a state which admits of a description in so-called laws of 
nature. Mathematics more than any other science, helps us to 
understand this lawdom of the objective world, and although mathe-
matical conceptions are purely mental, although there are no trigo-
nometrical ideas, no sines nor cosines, no algebraic formulas extant 
in the objective world, the theorems of mathematics, being con-
structed in the field of anyness, help us to understand any anal-
ogous products; and also to render possible thereby a comprehension 
of this real world of ours. 
ON T H E MAGIC CIRCLE. 
In the author's article on "Mediaeval Occultism" {The Monist, 
XVIII, 510) a suggestion was made to the effect that the magic 
circle which forms an integral part of all thaumaturgic ritual served 
to define or limit the magical environment. Further consideration 
on this matter combined with a study of Buddhist and Chinese 
occultism has led the author to extend the use of this circle to a 
considerable extent. 
It has long been recognized among anthropologists that temples 
as the residences of supernal powers represent in miniature the uni-
verse, and it is not difficult to show that the circle, with two per-
pendicular diameters oriented, is also a very widely used symbol 
for the universe, so that the magus operates as it were within a 
universe of his own creation. This then is the thesis of the present 
article, and it may be defined more generally as follows: 
"The magic circle is an essential feature of magical operations, 
and expresses symbolically the universe. Within this circle the 
magus by the processes of ritual evokes supernatural powers (as he 
conceives them to be) with a space relation to the corresponding 
positions in the physical universe and the ideal universe of occult 
philosophy. 
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